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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether functional diversification is value-enhancing or value-
destroying in the financial services sector, broadly defined. Based on a U.S. dataset comprising 
approximately 4,060 observations covering the period 1985-2004, we report a substantial and 
persistent conglomerate discount among financial intermediaries. The study differs materially 
from earlier work on scope dimensions of financial institution structures. Our results suggest 
that it is diversification that causes the discount, and not that troubled firms diversify into other 
more promising areas. In addition, the discount applies to all financial services industries with 
the exception of investment banking and is stable over different combinations of financial activ-
ity-areas with the exception of commercial banking units combined with insurance companies 
and/or investment banking activities. Finally, our results reveal that geographic diversification 
per se is not associated with a significant discount. Although geographic diversity is value de-
stroying in all financial services activity-areas when there are more geographic segments and the 
activities are distributed relatively evenly over these segments. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper attempts to ascertain whether or not functional diversification is value-
enhancing or value-destroying in the financial services industry. The degree of diversification 
can change either as a financial services firm divests or acquires assets, or as it redirects its 
activity into new business segments. Additionally, its portfolio of activities can shift over time 
due to divergent growth rates in the existing business segments and can assume more or less 
diverse geographic patterns. In contrast to previous studies’ focus on the banking sector 
alone,1 we consider diversification across the entire range of financial intermediation func-
tions – commercial banking, investment banking, insurance, asset management, and financial 
infrastructure services (clearance, settlement, payments, custody, etc.). 
Recent years have seen a burgeoning of mergers and acquisitions in the financial ser-
vices sector. Of approximately 360,000 M&A transactions in all industries valued at $27.5 
trillion during 1985-2006 worldwide, approximately 126,000 transactions valued at $11.5 tril-
lion (42 percent by value) involved the financial services industry.2 These transactions pre-
sumably had as their principal objective increasing the value of the firms involved through 
some combination of revenue enhancement, improved operating efficiency, or risk reduction. 
All of the transactions either increased the respective firm’s market share, defined function-
ally or geographically, or diversified its operations across financial functions or geographies 
(or both). Of the aforementioned financial-sector transactions, 21.4% by value were “cross-
market,” involving at least two areas of financial services activity, and about 8% were “cross-
border” involving more than one country. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Laeven and Levine (2007). 
2 The data cover only transactions valued at $100 million or more. Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Corporation. 
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Various arguments have been made in favor of diversification in marking the optimum 
institutional boundaries of financial services firms.3 Among the most important are cost and 
revenue economies of scope, lower tax burdens as a result of tax-efficient intra-firm transac-
tions, and more efficient internal as compared to external capital markets due to a better coor-
dination across highly specialized activity lines, better monitoring and control of capital ex-
penditures, sharing of managerial best-practices, etc., leading to better performance compared 
with specialized financial firms. Moreover, reduced bankruptcy risk due to less than perfectly 
correlated revenue streams across functions may result in improved debt ratings, higher debt 
capacity, higher share prices and lower WACC as compared to more specialized financial in-
termediaries. Finally, too-big-to-fail guarantees, provided by the public at zero or below-
market cost through the central bank or public guarantee agency, may support the creditwor-
thiness of the banking unit of a financial conglomerate and by extension the entire financial 
firm. Arguments that “bigger and broader is better” have found particular resonance in the 
strategies of financial firms based on the importance of information and transactions costs in 
financial intermediation and the potential for revenue economies of scope (cross-selling), and 
in turn the resultant LCFIs (large complex financial institutions) have been of great interest to 
those responsible for financial stability. Whether functional breadth creates or destroys eco-
nomic value is of “special” importance in the financial services sector. 
Arguments against diversification in financial intermediaries include cross-
subsidization among business lines, which may result in an inefficient allocation of capital 
and reduced performance incentives in profitable businesses. Diversification may lead to 
overinvestment in low-NPV projects attributable to excess free cash-flow and unused borrow-
ing capacity, as well as non-materiality of individual capital allocation errors in relation to 
firm’s overall market value. Conflicts of interest among clients and activity-areas of financial 
                                                 
3 For a detailed review of arguments for and against diversification in financial services firms, see Walter (2004), 
Chapter 3. 
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conglomerates may create incremental reputation risk, therefore higher debt costs and a lower 
share price. Whether the arguments for or against diversification and financial conglomerates 
dominate is a key issue in defining the strategies of financial intermediaries and the evolving 
architecture of national and global financial systems.  
This paper attempts to contribute to the empirical literature on corporate finance and 
industrial organization related to financial intermediaries, which so far has been constrained 
by the lack of comparability of data on key variables (e.g., sales, operating income, etc.) be-
tween financial and non-financial firms.4 By contrast, there is an extensive literature on the 
conglomerate discount for non-financial firms (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 
1995; Lins and Servaes, 1999; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). Our study is in the 
tradition of Berger and Ofek (1995) in seeking to determine whether, based on a large U.S. 
dataset on firms engaged in financial intermediation functions comprising approximately 
4,060 observations and covering the period 1985-2004, activity diversification is associated 
with a share price premium or discount. We extend the analysis by additionally including the 
geographic dimension of diversification (e.g., see Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002), investigating 
differences between firms operating in different financial activity-areas, and testing whether 
certain combinations of these financial businesses are more likely to destroy value than others. 
We also account for the endogeneity of the diversification decision in our econometric analy-
sis. 
In contrast to the literature on non-financial firms, the literature on valuation of finan-
cial conglomerates is very limited. The only study comparable to ours is Laeven and Levine 
(2007). This study is confined to the banking industry and comprises 836 banks from 43 dif-
ferent countries. The authors use Tobin’s q for financial conglomerates benchmarked against 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, 20.5% of all firms on the Compustat Industrial Annual File were classified as financial firms 
(SIC 6000-6999) in 1985, the beginning of our sample period. In 2004, the percentage of financial firms (NAICS 
520000-529999) had increased to 24.2%. However, part of this increase may be due to changes in reporting 
guidelines from FASB and lifting of financial regulations throughout the sample period. 
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the q the same firms might have had based on the adjusted q values of specialized financial 
firms, they find strong evidence of a conglomerate discount which withstands a battery of ro-
bustness and sensitivity checks. The authors conclude that all diversification of bank-based 
financial services firms is fundamentally value-destroying. They attribute (but cannot con-
firm) this result to agency problems associated with financial conglomerate structures, and 
conclude that their findings definitively negate the existence of scope economies in such firms. 
However, in contrast to this paper the authors limit their analysis to banks as opposed to all 
types of financial intermediaries, and they do not examine the geographic dimension of diver-
sification and the interaction between geographic and functional diversity. In addition, it is 
possible that their results are subject to survivorship bias.5  
A number of earlier empirical studies have back-tested the impact of hypothetical 
combinations of stand-alone firms in different areas of financial intermediation, and have 
conducted event studies of broadening or focusing merger announcements as well as regula-
tory changes making possible increased scope. The literature investigating the existence of 
economies of scope in the financial services firms provides mixed evidence (e.g., Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Mitchell and Onvural, 1995). More unequivo-
cal results have been found with respect to the risk-reducing effects of corporate diversifica-
tion: Santomero and Chung (1992), Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993), and Saunders and 
Walter (1994) all report risk-reducing effects associated with diversifying activities, in par-
ticular for combinations of banking and insurance activities. However, in a recent paper fo-
cusing on US financial holding companies, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that diversification 
from lending into non-interest activities damages risk-adjusted performance. Robust statistical 
                                                 
5 The total number of banks in their sample corresponds to the maximum of 836 bank observations in 2002 (the 
end of their sample period). Their use of Heckman’s (1979) self-selection model may have a limited meaning 
when banks with poor (or at least those with the worst) performance are excluded from the sample. However, 
Laeven and Levine’s results based on Heckman’s two-step procedure are consistent with ours. Given its focus 
solely on the banking sector, the Laeven and Levine study is largely complementary to the broad-gauge finan-
cial-services focus of this study. 
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results show that any scope-related gains are more than offset by the higher volatility of these 
activities. With respect to U.S. legislation making possible the creation of multi-functional 
financial intermediaries, Lown, Osler, Strahan, and Sufi (2000) find that both commercial and 
investment bank stocks rose on announcement by President Clinton on October 22, 1999 that 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was imminent. This finding is supported by Yu 
(2001) in an event-study of stock price reactions of U.S. financial services firms to the 1999 
Act, concluding that the market reacted most favorably in the case of large securities firms, 
large insurance companies, and bank holding companies already engaged in some securities 
businesses (those with so-called “Section 20 subsidiaries” allowing limited investment bank-
ing activities) and suggesting that the market expected gains from product diversification pos-
sibly arising from cross-product synergies or perhaps extension of “too big to fail” guarantees. 
Evidence from merger data includes Houston, James and Ryngaert (1999), who find 
that in-market (concentrating) mergers tend to create value upon announcement based on the 
U.S. financial services M&A deal-flow. Targets of in-market mergers gain and acquirers do 
not lose. In-market takeovers are expected to cut costs faster and more dramatically than mar-
ket-extending acquisitions. Similarly, DeLong (2001a) finds that the market reacts positively 
to bank mergers that focus activities and geography, concluding that efficient acquirers tend 
to improve the efficiency of the merged entity more than other acquirers.  
With respect to the geographic dimension of diversification, Cornett and Tehranian 
(1992) find that improvement is greater for bank mergers within U.S. states than between U.S. 
states, while Cornett, Hovakimian, Palia, and Tehranian (1998) find that mergers of partners 
headquartered in the same U.S. state earn higher returns than mergers with partners in differ-
ent U.S. states. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) find that the market rewards financial services 
mergers where geographic overlap exists between acquirer and target. DeLong (2001b) finds 
no significant relation between long-term performance of bank mergers and geographic over-
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lap between the two merged entities. Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, and Nguyen (2001) find that 
merger premiums increased by about 35 percent as a result of geographic deregulation, in this 
case the passage of the 1997 Riegle-Neal act, which eliminated geographic restrictions for 
U.S. banking operations. 
Our results show a substantial and persistent conglomerate discount among financial 
intermediaries. Moreover, our results suggest that it is diversification that causes the discount, 
and not that troubled firms diversify into other more promising areas. We use instrumental 
variables regressions and Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to control for the endogene-
ity of the diversification decision. Additionally, we investigate whether financial firms that 
diversify are already trading at a discount prior to the diversification, or whether their value 
decreases as a result of the diversification, by testing the relationship between changes in the 
degree of diversification and firm value. Our results suggest that it is diversification that 
causes the discount, and not that troubled firms diversify into other more promising areas.  
We also investigate whether the conglomerate discount depends on the firms’ main ac-
tivity-area or on the specific financial activity-areas that are combined. Most importantly, 
there is a significant conglomerate discount in all three main activity-areas – i.e., credit inter-
mediation, securities, and insurance. However, there is no conglomerate discount associated 
with investment banking. Diversification into non-financial activities is associated with a sig-
nificantly higher discount than diversification within the financial services sector only in the 
case of securities firms. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in the conglomerate 
discount between different combinations of financial activity-areas with two notable excep-
tions: Combinations between commercial banking and insurance and combinations between 
commercial banking and investment banking show a significant permium.  
Finally, we investigate the geographic dimension of diversification and find that geo-
graphic diversification in general (as measured by a dummy variable or the percentage of 
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sales stemming from non-domestic operations) is not associated with a discount. However, 
the results based on a Herfindahl-Hirschman index reveal that geographic diversity is value 
destroying when there are more geographic segments and when the activities are distributed 
relatively even over these segments. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the sources of 
data, the sample selection procedure, and describes the variables. Sections III and IV present 
the descriptive statistics based on univariate analysis, which is followed by the results from 
multivariate regression analysis. Section V investigates whether the conglomerate discount 
differs between financial services activity-areas and whether certain combinations of financial 
activities are more likely to destroy value than others. Section VI examines whether geo-
graphic extension of financial firms’ operations appear to create or destroy economic value. 
Section VII presents the conclusions. 
 
II. Sample selection and variables 
 
A. Sample selection 
 
The sample consists of all financial firms (SIC 6000-6999 and NAICS 520000-
529999) from 1985 to 2004, with data reported on both the Compustat Segment and Industrial 
Annual data files and total assets of at least $100 million. The data cover the broadly-defined 
US financial services sector – commercial banks and bank holding companies, insurance 
companies, asset managers and broker-dealers. We exclude years where more than 50% of a 
firm’s sales or assets stem from segments outside the financial sector or are classified as in-
vestment trusts (SIC 6730-6733 and 6798 and NAICS 525900-525990).6 We also exclude 
firms that are listed as American Depository Receipts (ADRs).7 To examine whether diversi-
                                                 
6 Compustat defines sales for financial companies as follows: total current operating revenue plus net pretax 
profit or loss on securities sold or redeemed minus non-recurring income. 
7 This restriction leads to a decrease in sample size of 131 firm-year observations (3.1%) for the excess value 
measure based on sales and 100 firm-year observations (2.6%) for the excess value measure based on assets. The 
inclusion of these observations does not materially change any of our results. 
 8
fication increases or decreases corporate value, we use the excess value measure developed by 
Berger and Ofek (1995). For a firm to be included in our sample, all data necessary to calcu-
late this excess value measure are required (see description below) leading to a final sample of 
664 firms with a total of 4,060 firm-year observations when the excess value measure is based 
on sales and 652 firms and 3,812 firm-year observations when the excess value measure is 
based on assets.  
During our sample period, the segment reporting changed from SIC to NAICS. Spe-
cifically, since 1998 firms report segment information based on NAICS. On Compustat’s 
Segments file, SIC codes are available for the years 1985 to 2000 and NAICS codes are avail-
able from 1990 to 2004. In general, we use NAICS codes where available (i.e., from 1990 to 
2004) and SIC otherwise. To account for possible changes in segment reporting due to the 
change from SIC to NAICS (and the replacement of SFAS 14 by SFAS 131), we perform two 
robustness checks: First, we construct sub-samples, which are exclusively based on SIC codes 
(from 1985 to 2000) and NAICS codes (from 1990 to 2004). Second, we split our sample pe-
riod into two sub-periods based on whether firms report segment information based on SIC 
(1985 to 1997) under SFAS 14 or NAICS (1998 to 2004) under SFAS 131, respectively.8
 
B. Measure of Excess Value 
 
 To examine whether diversification increases or decreases corporate value, we use an 
excess value measure that compares a firm’s value to its imputed value if its segments were 
operated as stand-alone entities (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Each segment of a diversified firm 
is valued based on the median sales (assets) multipliers for single-segment firms in that indus-
try. As already indicated, sales for financial companies are defined as total current operating 
                                                 
8 For all sub-samples and also when we use SIC codes where available and NAICS otherwise over the full sam-
ple, the results of the univariate as well as the multivariate analysis (Sections III and IV) are very robust. There-
fore, we only report the results for the full sample based on NAICS codes where available (i.e., from 1990 to 
2004) and SIC otherwise. 
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revenue plus net pretax profit or loss on securities sold or redeemed minus non-recurring in-
come. 
First, we calculate the imputed value for each segment by multiplying the segment’s 
sales (assets) by the median ratio of the market value to sales (assets) for single-segment firms 
in the same industry. The industry median ratios are based on the narrowest NAICS/SIC 
grouping that includes at least five single-segment firms with complete data and total assets of 
at least $100 million.9 Next, the imputed value of the firm is calculated as the sum of the im-
puted segment values. This number estimates the value of the firm if all of its segments were 
operated as stand-alone entities. Finally, excess value is calculated as the log of the ratio of a 
firm’s value to its imputed value. A negative excess value indicates that a firm trades at a dis-
count and a positive excess value implies that the firm trades at a premium. 
Some of the segments of diversified firms in our sample have no NAICS or SIC codes 
assigned by Compustat. In contrast, most have a segment name, usually stated as “corporate 
and other”, “eliminations”, “corporate and unallocated”, or a similar designation. We do not 
treat these segments separately, but rather attribute their sales (assets) proportionally to the 
remaining segments in order to sum to the correct figure for the firm’s total sales (assets). 
Nevertheless, for some of the diversified firms in our sample the sum of all segment sales (as-
sets) as provided by the Compustat Segment file disagrees with the respective firm total val-
ues from the Compustat Industrial Annual file. This problem is also noted by Berger and Ofek 
(1995), and we follow their approach by excluding observations for which the sum of the 
segment values deviates from the firm’s total value by more than 25%. This procedure leads 
to a reduction in sample size of 243 (5.1%) and 158 (3.6%) observations, respectively,  for the 
sales- and asset-based excess value measure. If the deviation is within 25%, we gross the 
firm’s imputed value up or down by the percentage deviation between the sum of its seg-
                                                 
9 Using sales (and assets) multipliers, the imputed value for 40.4% of all segments are based on five-digit 
NAICS (four-digit SIC) codes, 28.4% on four-digit NAICS (three-digit SIC) codes, 26.8% on three-digit NAICS 
(two-digit SIC) codes, and 4.5% on two-digit NAICS (one-digit SIC) codes.     
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10ments’ sales (assets) and total firm sales (assets).  Finally, again following Berger and Ofek 
(1995), we exclude extreme excess values from the analysis – i.e., the actual value is either 
larger than four times the imputed or less than one fourth of the imputed value – which results 
in the loss of 428 (9.5%) and 411 (9.7%) firm-year observations for sales- and asset-based 
excess value measures, respectively. This procedure leads to a final sample size of 664 firms 
with a total of 4,060 firm-year observations for the sales-based excess value measure and 652 
firms with a total of 3,812 firm-year observations for the asset-based excess value measure. 
Finally, we construct a third alternative excess value measure which is based on both 
sales and assets. The underlying presumption behind this “hybrid” excess value measure is 
that in some activity-areas assets-multiples are more meaningful to measure valuation and in 
others sales-multipliers are more meaningful. Specifically, we presume that a lower standard 
deviation of the multipliers of focused firms in an industry implies a higher precision in 
measurement and therefore a more meaningful imputed segment value. Hence, we calculate 
for each segment of a firm the corresponding median sales- and asset-multipliers and use that 
with the lower scaled standard deviation to calculate the imputed value of a segment (again 
industry median ratios are based on the narrowest NAICS/SIC grouping that includes at least 
five single-segment firms with complete data and total assets of at least $100 million). To ob-
tain the excess value measure we again calculate the imputed value of the firm as the sum of 
the imputed segment values. Finally, excess value is calculated as the log of the ratio of a 
firm’s value to its imputed value.11
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, we apply a stricter exclusion criterion and discard all observations for which the sum of the 
segment values deviates from the firm’s total value by more than 5%. This restriction leads to the exclusion of 
additional 271 and 224 observations for the sales- and asset-based excess value measures, respectively. How-
ever, our results remain qualitatively unchanged (see Section IV. A. and Panel B of Table 5).  
11 We are grateful to Yakov Amihud for suggesting this alternative measure of excess value. 
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C. Measures of Diversification 
 
 We use a series of alternative measures of diversification. The first is a dummy vari-
able which is equal to one if a firm reports more than one segment in Compustat’s Segments 
data file. Earlier evidence (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994) suggests that firms with two or more 
segments have a lower firm value than firms with one segment, but that there is no further 
significant drop in firm value when one moves from firms with j segments to firms with j + 1 
segments, where j ≥ 2.  
To investigate whether this finding is also valid for our sample of financial firms, we 
alternatively use the number of segments reported by Compustat. Additionally, we use a 
sales- and asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) following Lang and Stulz, (1994), 
Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997). These HHIs are computed as 
the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales (assets) as a proportion of the square of total 
sales (assets) for the firm. For example, if a firm has only one segment, its HHI is equal to one 
and if it has 10 segments that each contribute 10 percent of the sales (assets), its HHI is equal 
to 0.1. Hence, the HHI decreases as the degree of diversification increases. 
Prior research on non-financial firms (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995) revealed that only 
unrelated diversification (i.e., diversification at the two-digit SIC code level) is associated 
with a significant discount in firm value, and that there is no conglomerate valuation penalty 
for related diversification (i.e., diversification at the four-digit SIC level). We therefore inves-
tigate potential differences in the valuation effects associated with related and unrelated diver-
sification. However, given that all of the focused firms in our sample are exclusively in the 
financial sector (NAICS 520000-529999 and SIC 6000-6999) and the majority of sales and 
assets of diversified firms are attributed to the financial sector as well, the distinction between 
related and unrelated diversification is not directly comparable to that in previous research 
carried out with respect to non-financial firms. 
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Specifically, we construct a dummy variable, which has a value of one if a firm reports 
more than one segment based on three-digit-level NAICS codes (two-digit-level SIC codes) to 
measure unrelated diversification, and a similar dummy variable, which has a value of one if a 
firm reports more than one segment based on five-digit-level NAICS codes (four-digit-level 
SIC codes) to measure related diversification. It is important to bear in mind that diversifica-
tion takes place almost exclusively within the financial sector. However, 162 firm-year obser-
vations (4.0%) correspond to 49 different diversified firms with at least one segment outside 
the financial sector. Since in these cases the term “unrelated diversification” becomes compa-
rable to that used in prior research on non-financial firms (where firms are often diversified 
even at the one-digit-level SIC or two-digit-level NAICS code), we additionally construct a 
dummy variable, which is equal to one if a firm is diversified at the three- (NAICS) or two-
digit-level (SIC) and has at least one segment outside the financial sector.12
 
III. Univariate Analysis 
 
We begin the univariate analysis by investigating whether diversified and focused 
firms differ with respect to a number of variables. Table 1 reports the mean and median (as 
well as tests for differences in means and medians) for all variables used in the study for di-
versified and focused firms separately. All firms reporting more than one segment are classi-
fied as diversified. With one exception (the median of the ratio of intangible to total assets), 
the differences in means and medians between diversified and focused firms are statistically 
significant at the 1% level for all variables. Most important, the three excess value measures 
are all significantly higher for focused than for diversified financial firms, which provides ini-
tial evidence of a diversification discount for financial conglomerates. Moreover, diversified 
                                                 
12 We do not include activity-areas that are closely related to the financial sector such as funds, trusts, and other 
financial vehicles (NAICS 525, SIC 67), real estate (NAICS 531, SIC 65), and rental and leasing services 
(NAICS 532, SIC 73/75) in this dummy variable. Including these activity-areas increases the number of firm-
year observations  with diversification outside the financial sector to 366. However, the results on diversification 
into non-financial areas of activity (in Tables 5 and 9) remain largely unchanged when we include them (the only 
difference is explained in the corresponding text on Table 9). 
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firms are substantially larger (market value, sales, and assets), have higher leverage ratios 
(which is consistent with Lewellen, 1971), are less profitable (lower return on assets), and ex-
hibit lower book-to-market and q ratios. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the number of sample firms for each calendar year, along 
with the number (and percentage) of focused and diversified financial firms. The data show 
that the percentage of diversified firms in our sample decreases steadily from 53.2% in 1985 
to 27.3% in 1996 and then rises again to 48.9% in 2004. Comment and Jarrell (1995) show a 
steady trend toward greater focus in non-financial firms over their sample period from 1979 to 
1988. For example, in 1979, 38.1% of all firms in their sample reported one segment. In 1988, 
the percentage increased to 55.7%. Over the same period, the average number of segments 
reported dropped from 2.53 to 1.94. In a more recent study, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) 
find that the percentage of diversified firms in their sample of non-financial firms decreases 
from 26.3% in 1984 to 12.3% in 1997. 
In general, the percentage of diversified firms in our sample of financial firms seems 
to be somewhat higher compared to non-financial firms prior to 1997. Unfortunately, the 
sample period in other research on non-financial firms usually ends in 1997 or earlier, even 
for recent studies (e.g., the sample periods in Campa and Kedia (2002), Fauver, Houston, and 
Naranjo (2004), and Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) end in 1996, 1995, and 1997, respec-
tively). Consequently, we do not know whether the subsequent increase in the percentage of 
diversified firms is a general phenomenon or exclusively related to financial firms. 
The results in Table 2 show a large jump in the percentage of diversified firms be-
tween 1997 and 1998 when SFAS 131 superseded SFAS 14 in the regulation of segment re-
porting and SIC was replaced by NAICS.13 One of the major concerns that triggered these 
changes was an under-reporting of segments. In fact and consistent with our findings, Berger 
                                                 
13 In addition, the US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB) eliminated functional barriers between commer-
cial banking and insurance, and between commercial banking and investment banking. 
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and Hann (2003) show that the implementation of SFAS 131 has resulted in a greater number 
of segments being reported by non-financial firms. In unreported tests, we find that firms in-
creasing the number of reported segments under SFAS 131 experience a substantial drop in 
excess value from 1997 to 1998 when the “hidden” diversification is revealed. This result is 
also consistent with Berger and Hann (2003) and holds when we exclude firms undertaking 
acquisitions in 1998 in order to obtain a “cleaner” reporting change sample. As diversification 
before and after the introduction of SFAS 131 might not be directly comparable, we check the 
robustness of our results by repeating all analyses for the pre-1998 and post-1997 sub-
samples. Our main results are robust to this sample segmentation and prevail in both sub-
periods. Therefore, we do not report them in the paper for reasons of brevity.  
Finally, before switching to a multivariate setting, we investigate whether the con-
glomerate discount depends on the level of diversification (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994). The 
results are shown in Table 3 and report means and medians for all three excess value meas-
ures for different numbers of segments and for various values of the two HHIs. The results are 
consistent with those of Lang and Stulz (1994). There is a substantial drop in excess value be-
tween focused and diversified firms but once a firm is diversified, there is no additional dis-
count associated with increasing the number of segments from two to three or more. Similarly, 
there is a substantial difference in excess value between firms with HHI values (sales- and 
asset-based) equal to one and firms with HHI values smaller than one, but only minor differ-
ences in excess value between firms with different HHI values less than one. The results for 
the sales-based HHI are shown in Panel B and for the asset-based HHI in Panel C of Table 3. 
For the sales-based HHI, there is a substantial drop in the sales-based, asset-based, and hybrid 
excess value (results for the latter two not reported) when a firm moves from one to two seg-
ments but no further discount beyond that. For the asset-based HHI, all three excess value 
measures (results for the latter two not reported) decrease nearly monotonically as the HHI 
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decreases. However, there is still a large jump when firms move from one to a value below 
one, and smaller changes thereafter. 
 
IV. Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
A. Main results 
 
In this section, we investigate the existence of a diversification discount for financial 
firms in a multivariate framework. We estimate pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions 
of excess value on our measures of diversification and a number of control variables. To 
eliminate a potential omitted-variables bias and control for the effect of unobserved variables 
that are constant over time as well as unobserved variables that are constant over firms, we 
include calendar-year dummy variables and firm fixed effects (the coefficients are not re-
ported in the tables). Since the observations for one specific firm (for different years) are 
clearly not independent (within correlation), we compute cluster-robust standard errors and 
treat each firm as a cluster. 
We include two control variables in our standard regression specification. The natural loga-
rithm of total assets, ln(Assets), is included to cover the possibility that the observed differ-
ences in firm value are due to differences in efficiency between small and large firms rather 
than to the degree of diversification. The second control variable, Leverage, might affect firm 
value based on the role of debt in helping to discourage the overinvestment of free cash flow 
by self-serving managers (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). Debt can 
also create value by giving the management an opportunity to signal its willingness to distrib-
ute cash flows and to be monitored by lenders. Empirically, McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
find that book leverage is positively correlated with firm value when investment opportunities 
are scarce, which is consistent with the hypothesis that debt alleviates the overinvestment 
problem. Besides this agency- related motivation for the inclusion of leverage as a control 
variable, leverage might be of a special importance to financial firms. For example, a well-
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capitalized firm might have fewer incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking. Based on 
simple valuation models, we additionally include the return on assets as a measure of firm 
profitability.  
Finally, to control for growth opportunities, we include the past growth in sales (as-
sets) which is calculated as the average annual growth of sales (assets) over the past three 
years (e.g., Yermack, 1996). However, due to data availability the sample size substantially 
decreases when we include past growth in sales (or assets) resulting in 2,887 (2,719) firm-
year observation on 489 (492) firms. Since our results are very robust to the inclusion of this 
additional control variables (and the resulting sample reduction), we generally report regres-
sions without them.14 An alternative measure of growth prospects would be Tobin’s Q. How-
ever, Tobin’s Q is calculated in a very similar manner as our dependent variable and therefore 
should not be included as an explanatory variable. When we include the widely used ap-
proximation of Tobin’s Q, computed as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book 
value of debt to the book value of total assets, it is not surprising that the coefficient is always 
positive and significant at the 1% level or better. The coefficients on the diversification vari-
ables, however, remain qualitatively similar even when Tobin’s Q is included as an additional 
control variable.15
The results from estimating fixed effects panel regressions of the excess value meas-
ure based on sales (Panel A) and assets (Panel B), and the hybrid excess value measure based 
on sales and assets (Panel C) on measures of diversification and the two control variables are 
reported in Table 4. The results show that when we control for firm size, leverage, and profit-
                                                 
14 Results from regressions including the past growth in sales are reported in Panel A of Table 5. 
15 Lang and Stulz (1994) argue that specialized firms may have more trouble raising funds, and therefore exhibit 
a higher firm value than diversified firms because they are unable to exhaust available positive net present value 
projects. To control for this, we additionally include a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm pays a divi-
dend in the respective year and zero otherwise. The reasoning is that dividend-paying firms could invest more by 
cutting dividends and thus are unlikely to be capital-constrained. However, the coefficient on this variable is 
never estimated significant and the negative valuation effect of diversification remains qualitatively similar and 
significant at the 1% level in all specifications. Therefore, we do not report the results in a table. 
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ability diversified firms still trade at a discount of between approximately 9% (asset-based 
excess value measure) and 16% (sales-based excess value measure). Excess value is also re-
lated negatively to the number of segments and related positively to the Herfindahl-
Hirschman indices, confirming a diversification discount.  
With respect to the control variables, leverage is estimated to have a significantly 
negative effect on firm valuation. This result is somewhat surprising, since it contradicts Jen-
sen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis and might be related to well-capitalized firms having 
fewer incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking.16 The coefficients on firm size and profit-
ability are positive and insignificant for the sales-based and hybrid excess value measures. In 
contrast, firm size is estimated to have a significantly negative effect on firm valuation, while  
profitability is estimated to have a positive effect when the excess value measure is based on 
assets. These differences are related to the use of total assets in the computation of excess 
value, firm size and profitability. However, the coefficients on the diversification variables 
remain qualitatively similar, albeit somewhat reduced in the case of the dummy variable (Col-
umn 4). 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results from regressions including past growth in sales 
as an additional control variable for growth opportunities. Most importantly, the results indi-
cate that growth opportunities have a positive and significant effect on firm value while all 
other coefficients remain qualitatively similar.17 We also investigate whether the observed 
conglomerate discount documented so far is related to firm size and leverage by including in-
teraction terms between the diversification dummy variable and firm size and leverage in the 
standard regression specification as reported in Column 1 of Table 4. Both interactions terms 
are estimated positively. None of them, however, is statistically significant at the 10% level or 
                                                 
16 It is important to note that financial firms in general and banks in particular exhibit very high leverage ratios 
(see descriptive statistics in Table 1). More revealing results on the relation between leverage and firm value are 
provided in Section V where we split our sample based on the firms’ main activity-areas.  
17 Alternatively, we include the past growth in assets, which is calculated as the average annual growth of assets 
over the past three years, and find similar results. 
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better. Therefore, we do not report the results in a table.  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results from reestimating Panel A of Table 4 when all 
observations for which the sum of the segments’ sales deviates from the firm’s total sales by 
more than 5% (see footnote 10 in Section II. B.). As noted, this restriction leads to a reduction 
in sample size of 271 observations (6.7%) while the results remain basically unchanged. In 
unreported tests, we reestimate all other analyses in this section based on these stricter exclu-
sion rules and find them to be robust. 
Prior research on non-financial firms (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995) showed that only 
unrelated diversification (i.e., diversification at the two-digit SIC level) is associated with a 
significant discount in firm value, while there are no penalties for related diversification (i.e., 
diversification at the four-digit SIC level). As noted in Section II, we construct the following 
variables to investigate this issue: 1) A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm is di-
versified at the five- digit level for NAICS codes or the four-digit-level for SIC codes, in-
tended to measure related diversification; 2) A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm 
is diversified at the three-digit level for NAICS codes or at the two-digit-level for SIC codes 
(i.e., reports segments which differ at the three-digit level NAICS or the two-digit-level SIC 
codes). This variable aims to measure unrelated diversification; 3) A dummy variable, which 
is equal to one if a firm has at least one segment outside the financial services sector. As noted 
earlier, 162 firm-year observations (4.0%) correspond to financial firms with at least one 
segment outside the financial services sector.18
We find that of 1,643 diversified firm-year observations, 361 can be defined as related 
diversification (i.e., firms which are diversified at the five-digit level for NAICS codes or the 
four-digit-level for SIC codes) and 989 as unrelated diversification (i.e., firms which are di-
versified at the three-digit level for NAICS codes or the two-digit-level for SIC codes). 162 
                                                 
18 As indicated in Section II, when we include activities related to the financial services sector such as funds, 
trusts, and other financial vehicles, real estate, and rental and leasing services in the dummy variable measuring 
diversification outside the financial services sector, the results remain very similar.  
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firm-year observations refer to firms which operate in at least one segment outside the finan-
cial sector.19     
The results in Panel C of Table 5 show that, in contrast to non-financial firms, related 
and unrelated diversification seems to be associated with a similar discount for financial firms. 
Therefore we do not differentiate between related and unrelated diversification in the remain-
der of the paper. However, we do investigate whether the number of related and unrelated 
segments is significantly related to firm value: For all three “levels of relatedness,” the coeffi-
cient on the number of segments is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level or 
better (not reported in a table). 
Finally, we investigate whether diversification outside the financial sector is associ-
ated with a higher discount than diversification within the financial sector. The results in Col-
umn 9 show that the 49 firms (162 firm-year observations) with operations outside the finan-
cial sector exhibit a similar discount as the other diversified firms in our sample while the sta-
tistical significance is somewhat lower as compared to the coefficients on related and unre-
lated diversification due to a higher standard deviation. We repeat the analysis in Panel C for 
the excess value measure based on assets and the hybrid excess value measure. The results 
remain basically unchanged, and we do not report them in a table.20
 
B. Robustness checks: Is the diversification decision endogenous? 
 
So far, our analysis shows that financial conglomerates trade at a discount as com-
pared to focused firms in the financial sector in both univariate and multivariate tests. This 
raises the question of causality – whether firms that diversify are already trading at a discount 
                                                 
19 We also use an additional measure of diversification aiming to measure a level of diversification between the 
standard measures of related and unrelated diversification: A dummy variable, which is equal to one if a firm is 
diversified at the four-digit level for NAICS codes or the three-digit-level for SIC codes. 1239 firm-year obser-
vations can be classified as diversified at this “in-between” level. The regression coefficients (not reported in a 
table) are very close to those reported for related and unrelated diversification in Panel C of Table 5. 
20 As a further robustness test we estimate the regression equations in Tables 4 and 5 based on weighted least 
squares where the weighting is based on total assets. The results remain basically unchanged. Therefore, we do 
not report them in a table.  
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prior to the diversification, or whether their value decreases as a result of the diversification. 
In fact, recent research on non-financial firms suggests that corporate diversification strategies 
are determined endogenously (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). In this section, 
we undertake two alternative approaches to investigate this issue. First, we test whether a 
change in the degree of diversification is associated with a change in excess value. If diversi-
fied firms already trade at a discount before they diversify, this indicates that it is not diversi-
fication that causes the discount but that diversification might be a firm’s reaction to poor per-
formance.21 Second, we follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and account for a potential endoge-
neity of the corporate diversification strategy by estimating instrumental variables regressions 
and Heckman’s (1979) self-selection model. 
We begin our analysis by investigating the distribution of changes in diversification 
over time. In unreported tests, we find changes in diversification and focus to be rather 
equally distributed in the financial services industry over the full sample period, although (as 
already shown in Table 2), an unusually large number of changes occurred in 1998 when 
segment reporting changed from SIC to NAICS. Overall, 56 firms increased the degree of di-
versification and 19 increased focus, while the averages over the 19 years from 1986 to 2004 
are 10.47 and 8.21, respectively.22   
In Table 6 we investigate whether diversified firms already trade at a discount before 
they diversify or whether a discount appears only after the diversification. Panel A reports 
means and medians for the sales-based excess value measure for up to three years before a 
change in diversification or focus. The results show that previously focused firms that diver-
                                                 
21 In fact, for non-financial firms Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that an increase in the degree of diversifica-
tion is associated with a significant drop in stock returns while an increase in focus is associated with a substan-
tial increase in stock returns – their results show that a change of 0.1 in the absolute value of a sales-based HHI 
is associated with a stock return of about 4%, and that adding or subtracting one business segment is associated 
with a difference in returns of about 5%. 
22 In percentage terms, 21.29% of all sample firms experience an increase in the degree of diversification in 1998 
and 7.22% an increase in focus. The sample averages from 1986 to 2004 are 4.90% and 3.84%, respectively. 
However, when we exclude the year 1998 from the analysis in this section, the results remain qualitatively simi-
lar. 
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sify at some point during our sample period do not trade at a discount before diversification. 
Panel B reports the results of univariate OLS regressions of the change in excess value be-
tween years t and t-1 on a dummy variable, which is set equal to one if a previously focused 
firm diversifies (Column 1), a diversified firm increases the number of segments (Column 2), 
a diversified firm decreases the number of segments (Column 3), and a previously diversified 
firm refocuses (Column 4), respectively. Consistent with the findings of Comment and Jarrell 
(1995), we find that an increase in focus is positively related to firm value and a decrease in 
focus (or increase in diversification) is negatively related to firm value. The effect is stronger: 
(1) For previously diversified firms that become focused than for diversified firms that de-
crease the number of segments; and (2) for previously focused firms that become diversified 
than for diversified firms that increase the number of segments.23   
In combination, the results in Panels A and B suggest that it is diversification that 
causes the discount, and not troubled firms diversifying into other, more promising areas. In 
contrast, focusing firms trade at a very large discount before they decrease the number of 
segments in which they were active, or become completely focused. This finding suggests that 
the increase in focus may be due to external pressure (e.g., by active shareholders). 
Another potential concern regarding our results is that the documented diversification 
discount is due to conglomerates purchasing discounted target firms rather than diversification 
itself (e.g., Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002). We perform two simple tests in order to con-
trol for the effect of mergers on our results. First, we repeat the analysis in Panel A of Table 6 
(previously focused firms diversifying) and exclude all observations which are associated 
with a merger of the company taking place in the same year. The results (reported at the end 
                                                 
23 In unreported tests we also find that firms that increase focus experience a further significant increase in firm 
value over the subsequent year. In contrast, the change in excess value for focused firms that diversify remains 
negative for the following year but not statistically significant. Somewhat surprisingly, diversified firms increas-
ing the number of segments experience a significant increase in excess value in the subsequent year, which ex-
ceeds the decrease in the previous year in economic as well as statistical terms. Hence, given that a firm is al-
ready diversified a further diversification may be value increasing on average. 
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of Panel A) remain basically unchanged indicating that focused firms that diversify without 
acquisition (i.e., by redirecting their business activities) do not trade at a discount before di-
versification but trade at a large (and significant) discount thereafter. Second, we repeat the 
analysis in Column 1 of Panel B and exclude increases in diversification which take place in 
years in which the firm undertakes at least one acquisition. Again the results remain qualita-
tively similar (the coefficient is -0.140 with a p-value equal to 0.022) indicating that the con-
glomerate discount in our sample is not due to the acquisition of discounted targets. 
In a next step, we account for the potential endogeneity of the diversification variable 
by estimating instrumental variables regressions where the diversification dummy variable is 
instrumented. In the first stage, we regress the diversification dummy variable on all pre-
sumably exogenous variables in the excess value regression along with the predicted probabil-
ity of being diversified – which is obtained from a probit regression of the diversification 
dummy variable on various instruments. Alternatively, we directly include all exogenous 
variables and instruments in the first step regressions (instead of using the predicted probabil-
ity of being diversified). This latter model does not impose the (nonlinear) functional form of 
the probit model.24 The choice of instruments is based on Campa and Kedia (2002): the log of 
total assets, leverage, a dummy variable whether the firm pays a dividend, return on assets, a 
dummy variable whether the firm belongs to the S&P500 index, a dummy variable whether 
the firm is listed at NYSE, the fraction of diversified firms and the fraction of sales accounted 
for by diversified firms in the industry, median industry q and its lagged value, the number of 
M&A transactions in a given year (financial sector only), the annual value of completed 
                                                 
24 Following Campa and Kedia (2002), we also estimate both alternative models based on the (predicted) prob-
ability of diversifying (i.e., a dummy variable which is equal to one when a firms increases the number of seg-
ments and zero otherwise) instead of the (predicted) probability of being diversified in the first-step regressions. 
However, the results from all different specifications are qualitatively similar and therefore we do not report the 
results from these alternative specifications in a table. 
 23
25M&A deals in the financial sector in a given year, and GDP growth and its lagged value.  
We use the four-digit NAICS (three-digit SIC) codes to identify industries.  
In the second stage, we regress the excess value measure on the fitted value from the 
first stage, a number of control variables, and a set of year dummy variables (which are not 
reported in the table). The results from the instrumental variables regressions including the 
predicted probability of being diversified in the first stage regressions are reported in Columns 
1 and 2 and the results based on the specification directly including all exogenous variables 
and instruments in the first step regressions are reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7. In 
Columns 2 and 4, we additionally include a dummy variable whether the firm is included in 
the S&P 500 index in the second-step regression and the past growth in assets in the first and 
second-step regressions. Most importantly, the results indicate that the conglomerate discount 
increases rather than decreases and is statistically significant at the 1% level in all four regres-
sion specifications. 
Finally, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to control for the endogeneity 
of the diversification decision (e.g., see Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). In the 
first-step, we estimate a probit regression with a dummy variable whether the firm is diversi-
fied as the dependent variable. The choice of explanatory variables is the same as in the first-
step probit regression of the instrumental variables approach. In the second stage, we regress 
the sales-based excess value measure on the dummy variable whether the firm is diversified, 
the log of total assets, leverage, and the self-selection parameter (lambda). The results in 
Panel B of Table 7 (Column 5) reveal that the coefficient on the diversification dummy vari-
able remains negative and significant while the self-selection parameter is positive and insig-
nificant. Alternatively, we repeat the analysis by modeling the decision to diversify rather 
than being diversified as the firms’ endogenous choice (e.g., see Villalonga, 2004). Specifi-
                                                 
25 Data on the number and value of M&A transactions are from Thomson Financial’s SDC (Securities Data Cor-
poration) database, and data on GDP growth from NBER. 
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cally, in the first stage we estimate a probit regression with a dummy variable whether the 
firm diversified (i.e., increases the number of segments) as the dependent variable. The results 
in Column 6 reveal that the selection parameter (lambda) turns negative but remains insignifi-
cant while the coefficient on the diversification dummy variable remains basically unchanged.  
Finally, we check the robustness of these results by using alternative explanatory vari-
ables in the first stage probit regression (e.g., a dummy variable whether the firm is included 
in the S&P financial instead of S&P500 index, lagged values of the log of total assets and re-
turn on assets) and using the three-digit NAICS (two-digit SIC) codes to identify industries, 
repeat the analysis for the asset-based excess value measure and the hybrid excess value 
measure, and omit the year dummy variables in the second-stage regression. However, the 
results change only immaterially. For brevity we do not report them in a table.  
Summarizing, the results of the instrumental variables regressions and endogenous 
self-selection model confirm the existence of a diversification discount in financial conglom-
erates and reveal that, in contrast to non-financial firms, self-selection does not seem to drive 
the results. 
 
V. Combinations of financial activities 
 
In this section we investigate whether the conglomerate discount depends on the 
firms’ main activity-area or on the specific financial activity-areas that are combined. Our 
classification of the financial services activity-areas is necessarily based on the SIC and 
NAICS classification codes. We differentiate the following main activity-areas within the fi-
nancial services sector: credit intermediation and related activities (NAICS 522, SIC 60/61), 
securities, commodity contracts, and other financial investments and related activities 
(NAICS 523, SIC 62), insurance carriers and related activities (NAICS 524, SIC 63/64). In 
addition, we consider commercial banking (NAICS 5221, SIC 602) and investment banking 
(NAICS 52311, SIC 6211) which are both subsets of the credit and securities activity-areas, 
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respectively. Finally, we classify the remaining segments into funds, trusts, and other finan-
cial vehicles (NAICS 525, SIC 67), real estate (NAICS 531, SIC 65), rental and leasing ser-
vices (NAICS 532, SIC 73/75), and non-financial activities (i.e., all segments outside NAICS 
520000-532999 and SIC 6000-6999).  
Panel A of Table 8 reports the coverage of the financial services sectors by the sample 
firms conditional on the number of segments. The reported figures represent the number of 
firm-year observations with at least one segment classified as belonging the respective activ-
ity-area. The results in the first column show that the majority of our focused sample firms are 
insurance companies (1,226), followed by securities firms (584) and credit intermediaries 
(572). For the remaining 32 observations the financial activity-area indicated in Compustat’s 
Segment database differs from the firm’s industry classification as reported in Compustat’s 
Annual database whereas our sample selection (SIC 6000-6999 and NAICS 520000-529999) 
is based on the latter.26 For diversified firms the industry affiliation of the segments is roughly 
proportional.27
Panel B reports the number of diversified firm-year observations with at least one 
segment classified as belonging the corresponding financial sector conditional on the firms’ 
main activity-area (there is no diversified firm with commercial banking assigned as the main 
activity-area). The results show that for all four main activity-areas, not all observations in 
fact include a segment within the firm’s main activity-area. In general, the majority of the 
firms’ segments are concentrated in the credit intermediation, securities, and insurance sectors 
with a clear emphasis in the firms’ main activity-area. Perhaps as a consequence of the intro-
duction of the US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB) eliminating functional barriers 
                                                 
26 Hence, these 32 focused firms would be excluded from our sample based on their activity-area indicated in the 
Segment database. However, our results remain basically unchanged when we exclude them from our sample.  
27 The number of observations with at least one segment classified as commercial bank is surprisingly low – also 
when considered in relation to investment banking. In view of the fact that there is only one focused commercial 
bank in our sample, the imputed value of commercial banking segments are problematic since they are based on 
industry multipliers for credit intermediaries generally rather than only commercial banks. 
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between commercial and investment banking activities towards the end of our sample period, 
none of the diversified investment banks has a commercial banking segment. Rather the ac-
tivities of diversified investment banks are concentrated within the securities and investment 
banking business as well as the insurance and real estate sectors. Another interesting finding 
is that more firms (in absolute and percentage terms) classified as security companies have a 
segment in the commercial banking area than do credit intermediaries although commercial 
banking is a sub-segment of credit intermediation.  
 As a next step, we repeat our multivariate analysis of Table 4 for sub-samples based 
on the firms’ main activity-areas. The results are reported in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 9. Most 
importantly, there is a significant conglomerate discount in all three main activity-areas 
(credit intermediation, securities, and insurance). However, the discount is substantially 
smaller and insignificant for investment banks (Column 4) which are a subset of the securities 
firms in Column 2. A further result is that the negative effect of leverage on firm value docu-
mented in Tables 4, 5, and 7 is caused by the large number of insurance companies in the 
sample. For credit intermediaries and securities firms the effect of leverage is insignificant, 
and indeed for investment banks it is positive and significant at the 10% level. A possible rea-
son for the negative valuation effect of leverage in insurance companies could be related to 
the role of insurance reserves in determining the ability of firms to book profitable underwrit-
ing business with relatively low loss probabilities. In contrast, in banks leverage is unlikely to 
have a comparable impact on the profitability of lending or fee-based business, especially 
when combined with the influence of deposit insurance and regulatory mandates. In addition, 
profitability as measured by the return on assets seems to affect firm valuation of insurance 
companies only but not credit intermediaries and securities firms. 
In Columns 5 to 7, we investigate whether the valuation effect of diversification into 
non-financial activities depends on the firms’ activity-area by including an additional dummy 
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variable whether the firm has at least one segment outside the financial services sector. The 
results show that diversification into non-financial activities is only associated with a signifi-
cant increase in the discount in securities firms where the occurrence of this type of diversifi-
cation is the lowest in absolute (21) and percentage terms (2.6% of the observations).28 When 
we additionally include the segments calssified as funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles, 
real estate, and rental and leasing services (results not reported in a table), the coefficient on 
the non-financial segment dummy variable for securities firms turns insignificant as well, in-
dicating that only diversification completely unrelated to the financial services industry is as-
sociated with an incremental discount when diversification in general is accounted for. In un-
reported tests, we find these results to be robust to the inclusion of additional control variables 
such as the past growth in sales, Tobin’s Q, and a dummy variable whether the firm pays a 
dividend.  
Finally, we investigate whether the discount depends on either leverage or firm size in 
certain financial services activity-areas by including interaction terms between the diversifica-
tion dummy variable and leverage and the diversification dummy variable and firm size, re-
spectively. However, none of the interaction terms is significant at the 10% level or better 
while the results on the other coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged. Therefore, we do 
not report the results in a table.  
In Table 10, we investigate whether certain combinations of functional diversity are 
more likely to destroy value than others. We do this by constructing dummy variables for spe-
cific combinations of activity-areas covered by the firms’ segments. We differentiate the three 
main activity-areas – credit intermediation, securities firms, and insurance. In addition, we 
separately consider commercial banking and investment banking activities. However, the re-
                                                 
28 The non-financial segments of security firms cover various different industries with the following three mak-
ing up for the majority of observations: information services and data processing services (8) and publishing 
industries (5). The non-financial segments of credit intermediaries are located in similar industries while non-
financial segments of insurance companies are most often classified as professional, scientific, and technical 
services (44), ambulatory health care services (22), and administrative and support services (13).    
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sults in Table 10 show that the (incremental) effect on the conglomerate discount due to spe-
cific activity-area combinations is generally insignificant. The two notable exceptions are 
combinations of commercial banks and insurance companies and combinations between 
commercial and investment banks. The coefficient on both dummy variables is significantly 
positive and larger in absolute terms than the negative coefficient on the diversification 
dummy variable indicating a premium associated with these activity-area combinations.29 In 
unreported tests, we reestimate the regressions in Table 10 by including dummy variables 
measuring exclusive combinations of these activity-areas, i.e., firms with segments in the in-
dicated industries only. However, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Ta-
ble 10 although the number of industry combinations is substantially reduced to less than half 
of those in Table 10. Therefore, we do not report them in a table for the sake of brevity.  
We additionally look at the importance of the relative size of the segments by includ-
ing dummy variables whether the smaller of two segments amounts to 10% (20%) or less of 
the firms sales or assets. For firms with more than two segments, we consider the intervals of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as used in Panels B and C of Table 3. In both cases, there is 
no evidence that the conglomerate discount depends on the relative size of the segments, i.e., 
the distribution of sales or assets over the segments once the diversification dummy variable 
is accounted for. Finally, we investigate whether this result is symmetric or whether it de-
pends on the relative size of the combined activity-areas, i.e, whether the valuation effect dif-
fers between a combination of a large credit intermediation segment with a small insurance 
segment and a combination of a large insurance segment with a small credit intermediation 
segment. The results again indicate that there are no significant differences in the valuation 
effect and therefore are not reported in a table. 
                                                 
29 As already mentioned, there is only one focused commercial bank in our sample and therefore segments of 
diversified firms classified as commercial banks are benchmarked against focused firms in the credit business 
more broadly defined. If commercial banking activities are in general associated with higher firm values than 
other activities within credit intermediation, this valuation differences might be responsible for the results in 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 10.  
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Summarizing, the results of this section indicate that there is a significant conglomer-
ate discount across all three main financial services activity-areas, credit intermediation, secu-
rities, and insurance while there is no discount associated with diversified investment banks. 
Diversification into non-financial activities is only associated with a significantly higher dis-
count than diversification within the financial services sector in the case of securities firms. 
Leverage has a negative and significant effect on firm value in insurance companies only. Fi-
nally, we find no significant difference in the conglomerate discount between different com-
binations of financial services activity-areas with the exception of industry combinations in-
cluding commercial banks. 
 
VI. Geographic diversification 
 
Recent research shows that not only functional diversification but also geographic di-
versification is associated with a lower market value (e.g., see Denis, Denis and Yost; 2002, 
Fauver, Houston and Naranjo, 2004). However, the empirical evidence is not conclusive. 
Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999), for example, find a slight premium associated with geo-
graphical diversification in their sample of U.S. non-financial firms covering the period 1984 
to 1997. To our knowledge, there is no evidence so far on the relation between geographical 
diversification and firm value for financial intermediaries,30 although DeLong (2001b) argues 
that an analysis of the geographic dimension of diversification is more interesting for financial 
than non-financial firms since – in contrast to most manufacturing firms – financial services 
firms require proximity to the client. The empirical analysis in this section aims to fill this gap 
by including the geographic dimension of diversification into our analysis. The rationale put 
forward for geographic diversification include: (1) Domestic or regional market saturation or 
competition-policy limits on further consolidation; (2) Better macro or financial restructuring 
                                                 
30 However, there is some evidence on the announcement effect associated with focusing and diversifying bank 
mergers. DeLong (2001a), for example, shows for a sample of domestic U.S. mergers (where at least one firm is 
a bank) that bank mergers that focus both functional and geographic activities enhance firm value by roughly 3% 
while other mergers do not create value. 
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prospects in other geographic regions, helping to justify growth-stock valuations in equity 
markets; (3) The need for viable physical presence in major markets for wholesale financial 
services (e.g., fixed-income, primary and secondary equities, merger and acquisitions ser-
vices) that have themselves become global and require continuous client coverage and execu-
tion; (4) The search for first-mover advantages as financial deregulation opens local markets 
to outside competitors; and (5) Reduction in firm-specific risk associated with operations 
across currencies as well as macro and financial environments that are not perfectly correlated. 
Possible value-destroying factors associated with geographic diversity include the cost of in-
creased managerial and operational complexity, increased internal information and contract-
ing costs, heightened regulatory and compliance costs, as well as greater exposure to sover-
eign risk.31
One problem with geographic segment data compiled by Compustat is that there is no 
requirement by either the Financial Accounting Standards Board or the Securities and Ex-
change Commission regarding the grouping for geographic areas (e.g., see Denis, Denis, and 
Yost, 2002). Therefore, some firms report segment data for different countries, others for dif-
ferent continents or geographic areas (e.g., Southeast Asia), while some firms report segment 
data for countries and continents. As a result, two firms with identical operations in the same 
countries might report them very differently, so that the number of geographic segments re-
ported becomes a problematic measure of the degree of geographic diversification. As a 
proxy, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) use the percentage of sales (assets) from non-domestic 
operations. We use three alternative measures of geographic diversification: a dummy vari-
able whether a firm reports more than one geographic segment, the percentage of sales from 
non-domestic operations, and an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index.32,33
                                                 
31 For a discussion, see Walter (2004), Chapter 2. 
32 In our database, for 3,153 (out of 4,703) foreign segments the reported sales are zero. Since this number is 
only 13 (out of 6,320) for domestic segments, it suggests that financial firms regularly book sales from foreign 
operations as sales from domestic segments, and that this measure of geographic diversification may have lim-
 31
 To investigate whether the benefits of geographic diversification outweigh its costs, 
we employ the same multivariate framework we used in the analysis of functional diversifica-
tion. Specifically, we add alternative measures of geographic diversification into the regres-
sion equation reported in Column 1 of Table 4. The results in Column 1 of Table 11 show that 
the dummy variable for geographic diversity indicates a small (statistically insignificant) pre-
mium, on average, while the coefficient on functional diversification remains negative and 
significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the coefficient on the HHI in Column 2 is positive and 
significant indicating that geographical diversity is value destroying when there are more 
geographic regions and the activities are distributed relatively evenly over these regions.34
As a next step, we reestimate these regressions for sub-samples based on the firms’ 
main activity-area. The results in Columns 3 to 8 of Table 11 show differences in the valua-
tion effect of geographic diversification between different financial industries. The dummy 
variable is positive and significant for credit intermediaries and insurance companies indicat-
ing a premium associated with geographic diversification. In contrast, geographically diversi-
fied securities firms show a large and significant discount. For all three main activity-areas, 
the HHI is estimated positive and significant at the 10% level, confirming the results in Col-
umn 2 that geographic diversification has a negative valuation effect when there are more 
geographic segments and the activities are distributed relatively evenly over these different 
geographic regions. 
Finally, we investigate whether the valuation effect of geographic diversification de-
pends on whether a firm is functionally diversified or focused by additionally including an 
                                                                                                                                                        
ited meaning. Asset figures, however, are available only for approximately one fourth of firm-years leading us to 
concentrate on sales figures. 
33 Another particularity in the data on geographic segments is that numerous firms report sales and/or assets fig-
ures of -0.01 for one segment. If the segment name applies to countries rather than continents or geographic ar-
eas, these segments often refer to Bermuda or a similar location – suggesting a letterbox company operated for 
tax reasons. Consequently, we do not treat these segments separately. 
34 The coefficient on the percentage of sales from non-domestic operations is always negative but never esti-
mated significantly. Therefore, we do not report the corresponding results in a table for space reasons. 
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interaction term between functional and geographic diversification in the regression equations 
reported in Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Table 11. Unreported results , however, show that the 
coefficient on the interaction term is never significant at the 10% level or better while the co-
efficients on functional and geographic diversification remains qualitatively unchanged.35
Summarizing, our results on the geographic dimension of diversification show that 
geographic diversification in general is not associated with a valuation discount. However, the 
results based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index show that geographic diversity is value de-
stroying when there are more geographic segments and the activities are distributed relatively 
evenly over these segments. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
Two of the enduring issues related to the industrial organization of financial interme-
diation relate to scale and scope. Is bigger better? Is broader better? The latter, in turn, can 
have either functional or geographic dimensions, or both. The pattern of global mergers and 
acquisitions in the financial services sector, broadly defined, suggests firm-level strategies 
based the presumptive benefits of scale and scope – benefits that are of interest as well to 
regulators charged with financial system efficiency, stability and competitiveness. Past re-
search has focused on scale in financial intermediation, both in terms of firm-wide cost func-
tions and at the level of individual activities. Much less research has focused on scope, with 
respect to both costs and revenues, in part because of the difficult empirical issues involved. 
This paper contributes to the debate on scope in financial intermediation by adding to the em-
pirical evidence. 
                                                 
35 As in the case of functional diversification, there is a structural break in the percentage of geographically di-
versified firms between the years 1997 and 1998 (and between 1998 and 1999). This was a likely consequence of 
a change in the reporting standards for geographic segments by the FASB in 1997 as well as the repeal of the 
McFadden Act and the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, both passed in 1994. 
Hence, we check the robustness of the results in this section by re-estimating all regressions for the 1985-1997 
and 1998-2004 sub-samples separately. However, the results (not reported in a table) remain qualitatively similar 
with the only notable exception being that the coefficient on the dummy variable whether the firm is geographi-
cally diversified in Column 7 is not quite significant at the 10% level anymore in both sub-periods. 
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We show that the impact of functional scope among financial intermediaries is pre-
dominantly value-destroying. On balance, we conclude that the negative elements present in 
financial conglomerates outweigh the positive elements, so that functional breadth impairs 
both competitive performance and shareholder value. This conglomerate discount applies in 
all three main financial activity-areas considered in this paper: credit intermediation, securi-
ties, and insurance. In contrast, there is no conglomerate discount evident in the case of firms 
operating primarily in investment banking. The reason may be equity market expectations for 
abnormally rapid growth in securitized financial intermediation as compared to intermediation 
via banks, especially after US functional deregulation in 1999 – growth differentials that are 
global and have been documented in McKinsey Global Institute (2007). 
The conglomerate discount is also very stable over different combinations of financial 
services activity segments. Two notable exceptions are combinations of commercial banking 
units and insurance companies as well as combinations between commercial and investment 
banking activities which both exhibit a significant valuation permium. Finally, our results 
show that geographic diversification per se is not associated with a significant discount. How-
ever, geographic diversity is value destroying in all financial services businesses when there 
are more geographic segments and the activities are distributed relatively evenly over those 
segments. 
The question remains why, given the evidence of a significant conglomerate discount 
associated with multifunctional financial services firms, management and boards of such 
firms persist in strategies rooted in the notion that broader is better. We posit that the rationale 
is similar to that historically associated with non-financial conglomerates, including improved 
earnings stability and the expectation of productive cross-selling, along with improved X-
efficiencies and scale economies associated with common platforms, notably information 
technology. Survey-based research by Coyne, Mendonca, and Wilson (2004) suggests that 
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managers of financial services firms systematically overestimate both revenue and cost 
economies of scope when justifying M&A initiatives that lead to greater breadth of activity-
areas. Such overestimation, along with behavioral characteristics such as strategic emulation, 
may be part of the story, coupled to boardroom dynamics and overreliance on management 
estimates. So far, however, there is no hard empirical evidence of the relationships involved. 
Nevertheless, we expect that large-sample studies such as ours, together with value-enhancing 
cases of breakups of multifunctional financial firms such as ABN Amro in 2007, will help 
document the valuation “headwind” that financial conglomerates face, and contribute to more 
firmly-anchored strategies in the financial services sector. Reliance on market discipline to 
sort out value-accretive and value-destructive firm strategies also strengthens the case for 
regulatory neutrality and a level playing field in determining the optimum strategic architec-
ture of financial firms. 
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Table 1: Comparison of focused and diversified firms 
 
  Focused Diversified Difference  
  Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median   
 Excess value (sales) -0.030 0.000 2417  -0.188 -0.209 1643  0.158 *** 0.209 ***  
 Excess value (assets) 0.004 0.000 2478  -0.194 -0.170 1436  0.198 *** 0.170 ***  
 Excess value (hybrid) -0.017 0.000 2439  -0.173 -0.190 1643  0.157 *** 0.190 ***  
 Number of segments 1.000 1.000 2417  2.884 3.000 1643  -1.884 *** -2.000 ***  
 Herfindahl (sales) 1.000 1.000 2417  0.664 0.645 1601  0.337 *** 0.356 ***  
 Herfindahl (assets) 1.000 1.000 2339  0.658 0.639 1454  0.342 *** 0.361 ***  
 Total assets 4469.657 580.340 2417  17743.180 3227.630 1643  -13273.523 *** -2647.290 ***  
 Sales 734.302 203.360 2417  3565.509 943.900 1643  -2831.207 *** -740.540 ***  
 Leverage 0.683 0.743 2411  0.774 0.813 1643  -0.091 *** -0.070 ***  
 Market value of company 3816.569 419.924 2417  7349.805 1342.898 1643  -3533.236 *** -922.974 ***  
 Market-to-book value 1.845 1.263 2411  1.502 1.193 1643  0.342 *** 0.070 ***  
 Q 1.484 1.117 2411  1.237 1.048 1643  0.247 *** 0.069 ***  
 Return on assets 0.041 0.030 2417  0.025 0.019 1643  0.016 *** 0.012 ***  
 Dividend dummy variable 0.658 1.000 2417  0.825 1.000 1643  -0.167 *** 0.000 ***  
 Intangible to total assets 0.065 0.001 2020  0.059 0.012 1196  0.006  -0.011 ***  
 
This table presents mean and median values and the number of observations (N) for all variables used in the study for single- (focused) and multi-segment (diversified) firms sepa-
rately. All firms reporting more than one segment (with differing SIC or NAICS codes) are classified as diversified. The equality of means is tested using a standard t-test and the 
equality of medians using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 39
Table 2: Sample overview by calendar year 
 
 Year Focused Focused (%) Diversified Diversified (%) N 
      
 1985 22 46.81% 25 53.19% 47 
 1986 76 53.90% 65 46.10% 141 
 1987 80 52.63% 72 47.37% 152 
 1988 77 51.33% 73 48.67% 150 
 1989 75 52.08% 69 47.92% 144 
 1990 71 54.62% 59 45.38% 130 
 1991 93 61.59% 58 38.41% 151 
 1992 113 63.48% 65 36.52% 178 
 1993 161 67.36% 78 32.64% 239 
 1994 181 67.04% 89 32.96% 270 
 1995 205 69.97% 88 30.03% 293 
 1996 230 72.56% 87 27.44% 317 
 1997 213 69.38% 94 30.62% 307 
 1998 144 54.75% 119 45.25% 263 
 1999 121 54.26% 102 45.74% 223 
 2000 112 53.59% 97 46.41% 209 
 2001 111 53.62% 96 46.38% 207 
 2002 104 52.00% 96 48.00% 200 
 2003 115 52.75% 103 47.25% 218 
 2004 113 51.13% 108 48.87% 221 
   
 Sum 2417 1643 4060 
      
 
This table reports the number and percentage of focused firms in the sample, the number and percentage of 
diversified firms in the sample, and the number of total observations (N) for each sample calendar year. All 
firms reporting more than one segment (with differing SIC or NAICS) codes are classified as diversified. 
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Table 3: Mean and median excess value for various degrees of diversification 
 
 Panel A: Number of Segments 
  1 2 3 4  ≥5
  Excess Value Mean -0.0300 -0.1891 -0.1776 -0.2047 -0.1851
  (Sales) Median 0.0000 -0.2023 -0.1904 -0.2119 -0.2748
  Obs. 2417 795 486 222  140
  Excess Value Mean -0.0251 -0.1709 -0.1707 -0.1768 -0.1973
  (Assets) Median 0.0000 -0.1832 -0.2013 -0.2296 -0.2432
  Obs. 2339 668 452 220  133
  Excess Value Mean -0.0226 -0.1643 -0.1768 -0.1904 -0.1452
  (Hybrid) Median 0.0000 -0.1824 -0.1867 -0.2054 -0.2373
  Obs. 2439 795 488 221  139
 Panel B: Sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HS) 
   1 0.8≤HS<1 0.6≤HS<0.8 0.4≤HS<0.6 HS<0.4
  Excess Value Mean -0.0304 -0.2087 -0.1526 -0.1776 -0.2040
  (Sales) Median 0.0000 -0.2281 -0.1623 -0.1902 -0.2636
  Obs. 2420 490 405 539  164
 Panel C: Asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HA) 
   1 0.8≤HA<1 0.6≤HA<0.8 0.4≤HA<0.6 HA<0.4
  Excess Value Mean -0.0248 -0.1348 -0.1776 -0.1771 -0.2636
  (Assets) Median 0.0000 -0.1446 -0.2116 -0.1834 -0.2817
  Obs. 2344 432 367 499  151
 
This table reports mean and median values of the excess value measures based on sales and assets, and the hybrid 
excess value measure for different numbers of segments (Panel A) and for various values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
indices (Panels B and C). 
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Table 4: Fixed effects panel regressions of the sales-, asset-based and hybrid excess value measures 
 
 Dependent Variable Excess Value (Sales)  Excess Value (Assets) Excess Value (Hybrid) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)   (7) (8) (9)  
 Intercept 0.295 * 0.380 ** 0.047   0.687 *** 0.738 *** 0.367 **  0.257 0.330** 0.018  
  (1.916)  (2.429)  (0.256)   (5.669)  (6.102)  (2.308)   (1.643) (2.072) (0.097)  
 Diversified -0.155 ***    -0.092 **    -0.130***    
  (-3.874)     (-2.499)     (-3.148)    
 Number of Segments   -0.049 ***    -0.045 ***    -0.044**   
    (-2.902)     (-2.932)     (-2.465)   
 Herfindahl (Sales)    0.292 ***        0.278**  
     (2.746)         (2.505)  
 Herfindahl (Assets)        0.345 ***      
         (3.275)       
 ln(Assets) 0.012  0.004  0.002   -0.067 *** -0.068 *** -0.071 ***  0.016 0.010 0.008  
  (0.600)  (0.183)  (0.090)   (-4.172)  (-4.214)  (-4.527)   (0.824) (0.499) (0.423)  
 Leverage -0.564 *** -0.568 *** -0.557 ***  -0.365 *** -0.364 *** -0.351 ***  -0.556*** -0.560*** -0.549***  
  (-3.276)  (-3.282)  (-3.172)   (-3.222)  (-3.203)  (-3.110)   (-3.042) (-3.040) (-2.949)  
 ROA 0.152  0.136  0.129   0.697 *** 0.699 *** 0.711 ***  0.164 0.151 0.146  
  (0.658)  (0.587)  (0.555)   (4.637)  (4.637)  (4.665)   (0.690) (0.635) (0.613)  
 R-squared (within) 0.032  0.025  0.026   0.079  0.079  0.085   0.023 0.019 0.021  
 F-test 6.570 *** 5.161 *** 4.847 ***  19.653 *** 20.838 *** 21.281 ***  4.910*** 4.054*** 3.982***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)  
 Firms 664  664  664   669  669  669   664 664 664  
 N 4,054  4,054  4,012   3,898  3,898  3,880   4,054 4,054 4,012  
 
This table reports estimates from fixed effects regressions of the excess value measure based on sales (Columns 1-3), assets (Columns 4-6), and both (Columns 7-9) on 
different measures of diversification and control variables. We include the following explanatory variables: a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one seg-
ment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), the number of reported segments (Number of Segments), a sales- and an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
computed as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales (assets) as a proportion of total sales (assets) for the firm (Herfindahl (Sales) and Herfindahl (Assets)), the natu-
ral logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), book leverage (Leverage), and return on assets (ROA). The standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the cluster-robust variant 
of the Huber-White sandwich estimator, which accounts for the dependence of observations within clusters (different year-observations for one specific firm). An F-test is 
performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant). ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 5: Fixed effects regressions of the sales-based excess value measure: Additional controls, related vs. unrelated diversification, and sample re-
strictions 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value based on Sales 
  Panel A: Past growth in assets  Panel B: 5% tolerance threshold Panel C: Related vs. unrelated Diversification
  (1) (2) (3) (7) (8)  (9)   (4) (5) (6)  
 Intercept 0.191  0.304  -0.150   0.252  0.342 ** -0.043   0.330** 0.339** 0.346**  
                           (0.988)  (1.555)  (-0.679)   (1.595)  (2.150)  (-0.223)   (2.142) (2.171) (2.212)  
 Diversified -0.182 ***    -0.177 ***         
                           (-4.075)     (-4.155)          
 Number of Segments   -0.068 ***    -0.053 ***       
                             (-3.647)     (-2.986)        
 Herfindahl (Sales)    0.392 ***     0.345 ***      
                              (3.382)      (2.989)       
 Diversified (related)           -0.105**    
                                     (-2.107)    
 Diversified (unrelated)            -0.112***   
                                      (-2.729)   
 Non-financial Segment             -0.122* 
1
 
              (-  .940)  
 ln(Assets) 0.032  0.023  0.021   0.018  0.008  0.007   0.000 -0.001 -0.002  
                           (1.393)  (0.950)  (0.917)   (0.925)  (0.435)  (0.367)   (0.019) (-0.037) (-0.127)  
 Leverage -0.664 *** -0.662 *** -0.653 ***  -0.561 *** -0.562 *** -0.556 ***  -0.577*** -0.551*** -0.574***  
                           (-2.950)  (-2.936)  (-2.885)   (-3.423)  (-3.393)  (-3.282)   (-3.342) (-3.149) (-3.292)  
 ROA 0.016  0.016  0.030   0.073  0.058  0.049   0.121 0.132 0.123  
                           (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.087)   (0.309)  (0.246)  (0.207)   (0.522) (0.566) (0.529)  
 Past Sales Growth 0.045 *** 0.047 *** 0.046 ***           
  (2.757)  (2.926)  (2.728)            
 R-squared (within) 0.056  0.050  0.052   0.034  0.025  0.028   0.021 0.025 0.022  
 F-test 7.062 *** 6.431 *** 5.500 ***  7.532 *** 5.431 ***  5.140 ***  3.881*** 5.146*** 4.255***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.004) (0.000) (0.002)  
 Firms 489  489  489   652  652  652   664 664 664  
 N 2,887  2,887  2,852   3,783  3,783  3,741   4,054 4,054 4,054  
 
Panel A reports estimates from fixed effects regressions of the excess value measure based on sales on different measures of diversification and control variables. We include the 
following explanatory variables: a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), the number of reported seg-
ments (Number of Segments), a sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index computed as the sum of the squares of each segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales for the firm 
(Herfindahl (Sales)), the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), book leverage (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), the average sales growth over the last three years (Past 
Sales Growth). In Panel B, we exclude all observations for which the sum of the segment values of sales or assets deviates from the firm’s total value by more than 5% (instead 
of the 25% used in the remainder of the paper and as explained in Section II. B.). Panel C reports estimates from fixed effects regressions of the excess value measure based on 
sales on different measures of related and unrelated diversification and control variables. The measures of diversification are defined as follows: A dummy variable which is 
equal to one if a firm is diversified at the five- digit level for NAICS codes or the four-digit-level for SIC codes (Diversified (related)), a dummy variable which is equal to one if 
a firm is diversified at the three-digit level for NAICS codes or at the two-digit-level for SIC codes (Diversified (unrelated)), and a dummy variable which is equal to one if a 
firm has at least one segment outside the financial services sector (Non-financial segment). The standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the cluster-robust variant of the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator, which accounts for the dependence of observations within clusters (different year-observations for one specific firm). An F-test is performed 
for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant). ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 6: The valuation effect of changes in diversification and focus 
 
 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics         
  Excess Value  Excess Value (t-1) Excess Value (t-2) Excess Value (t-3)   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 Previously focused firms diversifying       
 Mean -0.100  0.029  0.050  0.019   
 Median -0.113  0.000  0.018  -0.005   
 Obs. 106  105  90  73   
 Diversified firms increasing the number of segments       
 Mean -0.100  -0.009  -0.125  -0.085   
 Median -0.187  -0.060  -0.172  -0.220   
 Obs. 93  93  74  72   
 Diversified firms decreasing the number of segments       
 Mean -0.146  -0.213  -0.187  -0.249   
 Median -0.140  -0.237  -0.209  -0.218   
 Obs. 107  107  95  87   
 Previously diversified firms focusing        
 Mean -0.156  -0.321  -0.244  -0.287   
 Median -0.236  -0.324  -0.255  -0.274   
 Obs. 49  49  44  37   
 Previously focused firms diversifying (acquisitions excluded)     
 Mean -0.113  0.034  0.028  -0.005   
 Median -0.125  0.000  0.040  -0.017   
 Obs. 63  63  54  43   
 Panel B: Univariate Regressions of Δ Excess Value       
  Focused Firms  Diversified Firms Diversified Firms Diversified Firms   
  Diversifying  Diversifying Focusing becoming Focused   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 Intercept -0.011 * -0.012 ** -0.017 *** -0.017 ***  
  (0.078)  (0.045)  (0.006)  (0.004)   
 Coefficient -0.124 ** -0.078 * 0.084 ** 0.182 **  
  (0.016)  (0.060)  (0.045)  (0.016)   
 R-squared 0.002  0.001  0.001  0.003   
 Firms 574  574  574  574   
 N 3420  3420  3420  3420   
 
Panel A of this table reports mean and median values of the sales-based excess value measure for years t, t-1, t-
2, and t-3 for previously focused firms diversifying in year t, diversified firms increasing the number of seg-
ments in year t, diversified firms decreasing the number of segments in year t, and previously diversified firms 
refocusing in year t. Panel B reports the results of univariate OLS regressions of the change in excess value 
between years t and t-1 on a dummy variable, which is equal to one if a previously focused firm diversifies 
(Column 1), a diversified firm increases the number of segments (Column 2), a diversified firm decreases the 
number of segments (Column 3), and a previously diversified firm refocuses (Column 4). The numbers in pa-
rentheses are p-values for two-sided tests. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
 46
Table 7: Instrumental variables and Heckman two-step regressions of the sales-based excess value measure 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value based on Sales  
  Panel A: Instrumental variables regressions  Panel B: Heckman selection model  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)   
 Intercept -0.321 *** -0.472 *** -0.329 *** -0.500 ***  -0.403 ** -0.228 *  
                           (-2.642)  (-3.240)  (-2.748)  (-3.525)   (-2.214)  (-1.701)   
 Diversified -0.391 *** -0.310 ** -0.413 *** -0.385 **  -0.236 *** -0.247 ***  
                           (-2.623)  (-1.990)  (-2.655)  (-2.431)   (-6.051)  (-6.500)   
 ln(Assets) 0.097 *** 0.103 *** 0.099 *** 0.111 ***  0.102 *** 0.094 ***  
                           (4.553)  (4.215)  (4.584)  (4.564)   (5.917)  (7.231)   
 Leverage -0.559 *** -0.591 *** -0.558 *** -0.588 ***  -0.536 *** -0.547 ***  
                           (-5.071)  (-4.058)  (-5.210)  (-4.241)   (-5.469)  (-5.698)   
 ROA -0.104  0.068  -0.110  0.055   -0.098  -0.092   
                           (-0.465)  (0.223)  (-0.482)  (0.180)   (-0.970)  (-0.893)   
 S&P 500   0.139 *  0.139 *       
                             (1.655)   (1.683)        
 Past Assets Growth   0.058 ***  0.056 ***       
                             (3.071)   (3.151)        
 Lambda        0.062  -0.005   
         (1.169)  (-0.136)   
 R-squared 0.075  0.112  0.087  0.134   0.093  0.092   
 F-test 4.480 *** 6.022 *** 4.761 *** 6.280 ***  23.416 *** 23.084 ***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   
 Firms 657  485  657  485   657  657   
 N                         3,987  2,881  3,987  2,881   3,987  3,987   
 
This table reports estimates from instrumental variables regressions (Panel A) and Heckman (1979)’s self-selection model (Panel B) for the excess value measure based 
on sales. We include the following explanatory variables in the second-stage regressions: a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one segment on 
Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), book leverage (Leverage), return on assets (ROA), a dummy variable 
whether the firm belongs to the S&P500 index (S&P 500), and past growth in assets over the last three years (Past Assets Growth). The first-stage regressions (not 
reported) include the following explanatory variables/instruments: the log of total assets, leverage, a dummy variable whether the firm pays a dividend, return on assets, 
dummy variables whether the firm belongs to the S&P500 index and whether it is listed at NYSE, the fraction of diversified firms and the fraction of sales accounted 
for by diversified firms in the industry, median industry Q and its lagged value, the number of M&A transactions in a given year (financial sector only) and the annual 
value of completed deals, and GDP growth and its lagged value. In Panel B, the selection variable in the first-stage regression is a dummy variable whether the firm is 
diversified (Column 5) or a dummy variable whether the firm diversifies, i.e., increases the number of segments (Column 6). Lambda is the self-selection parameter. 
The standard errors (in parentheses) in Columns 1 to 4 are based on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich estimator, which accounts for the depend-
ence of observations within clusters (different year-observations for one specific firm). An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (ex-
cept the constant). ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 8: Segment affiliation of sample firms conditional on the number of segments and main industry 
 
 Panel A: Number of Segments: 1 2 3 4 >=5  
 Credit Intermediation 572 140 164 101 39  
 Commercial Banking 1 25 7 17 14  
 Securities, Commodity Contr., 584 210 132 81 70  
 and other Financial Investm.       
 Investment Banking 170 66 28 33 21  
 Insurance 1,226 597 428 192 127  
 Funds, Trusts, and other 23 10 28 21 12  
 Financial Vehicles       
 Real Estate 8 31 23 23 15  
 Rental and Leasing Services 1 17 14 9 17  
 Non-Financial Activities 0 100 37 21 4  
 Total 2,417 1,196 861 498 319  
 Firm-Years 2,417 795 486 222 140  
 Firms 504 235 123 59 31  
 Panel B: Main Industry: Credit Intermediation Securities, Commodity Investment Banking Insurance  
 (Diversified Firms only)  Contracts, and other   
   Financial Investments   
 Credit Intermediation 162 72 2 200  
 Commercial Banking 10 36 0 15  
 Securities, Commodity Contr., 56 185 40 242  
 and other Financial Investm.      
 Investment Banking 23 82 36 37  
 Insurance 70 31 20 1,239  
 Funds, Trusts, and other  5 12 2 47  
 Financial Vehicles      
 Real Estate 19 18 8 39  
 Rental and Leasing Services 21 8 0 28  
 Non-Financial Activities 41 21 0 99  
 Total 407 465 108 1,946  
 Firm-Years 167 202 42 1,243  
 Firms 43 48 16 201  
 
Panel A of the table reports the coverage of the financial services sectors by the sample firms conditional on the number of seg-
ments (Panel A) and the firms’ main industry (Panel B). The classification of the financial services industries is based on the SIC 
and NAICS classification codes. We differentiate the following sectors: credit intermediation and related activities (NAICS 522, 
SIC 60/61), commercial banking (NAICS 5221, SIC 602), securities, commodity contracts, and other financial investments and 
related activities (NAICS 523, SIC 62), investment banking (NAICS 52311, SIC 6211), insurance carriers and related activities 
(NAICS 524, SIC 63/64), funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles (NAICS(525, SIC67), real estate (NAICS 531, SIC 65), 
rental and leasing services (NAICS 532, SIC 73/75), and non-financial activities (i.e., all segments outside NAICS 520000-
532999 and SIC 6000-6999). The reported numbers indicate the number of sample firms with at least one segment classified as 
belonging the corresponding financial sector. Panel B includes diversified firms only. 
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Table 9: Fixed effects regressions of the sales-based excess value measure for sub-samples based on the firms’ main financial sector 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value based on Sales         
 Financial Sector: Credit  Securities  Insurance  Investment B.  Credit  Securities  Insurance   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)   
 Intercept -0.554  -0.288  0.726 *** -1.328 ** -0.548  -0.255  0.721 ***  
                           (-1.339)  (-1.229)  (3.251)  (-2.354)  (-1.313)  (-1.104)  (3.215)   
 Diversified               -0.187 ** -0.284 *** -0.112 ** -0.042  -0.176 ** -0.263 *** -0.109 **  
                           (-2.157)  (-3.049)  (-2.329)  (-0.210)  (-2.070)  (-2.724)  (-2.199)   
 Non-financial Segment       -0.034  -0.321 *** -0.032   
                                 (-0.285)  (-2.761)  (-0.386)   
 ln(Assets) 0.080 * 0.027  -0.001  0.047  0.080 * 0.021  -0.001   
                           (1.702)  (0.737)  (-0.046)  (0.791)  (1.709)  (0.589)  (-0.034)   
 Leverage -0.012  0.157  -1.065 *** 1.199 * -0.023  0.165  -1.063 ***  
                           (-0.034)  (0.751)  (-3.320)  (1.968)  (-0.063)  (0.796)  (-3.306)   
 ROA 0.276  0.165  0.974 ** 0.099  0.277  0.170  0.977 **  
                           (0.581)  (0.699)  (2.191)  (0.211)  (0.584)  (0.752)  (2.195)   
 R-squared (within) 0.032  0.058  0.102  0.074  0.021  0.029  0.096   
 F-test 1.690  4.840 *** 8.800 *** 1.690  1.340  8.470 *** 7.200 ***  
  (0.155)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.179)  (0.249)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
 Firms 162  133  346  31  162  133  346   
 Obs. with non-Fin. Segm. 41  21  99  0  41  21  99   
 N                         714  808  2,469  179  714  808  2,469   
 
This table reports estimates from fixed effects regressions of the excess value measure based on sales for sub-samples based on the firms’s main activity-area within the financial 
services sector. We include the following explanatory variables: a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), 
the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), book leverage (Leverage), and return on assets (ROA). Panel B additionally includes a dummy variable which is equal to one if a 
firm has at least one segment outside the financial services sector (Non-financial segment). The financial sectors are based on the SIC and NAICS classification codes and defined 
as follows: credit intermediation and related activities (NAICS 522, SIC 60/61), securities, commodity contracts, and other financial investments and related activities (NAICS 
523, SIC 62), insurance carriers and related activities (NAICS 524, SIC 63/64), and investment banking (NAICS 52311, SIC 6211). The standard errors (in parentheses) are based 
on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich estimator, which accounts for the dependence of observations within clusters (different year-observations for one spe-
cific firm). An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant). ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 10: Fixed effects regressions of the sales-based excess value measure including dummy variables for specific combinations of activities 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value based on Sales          
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)   
 Constant 0.302 ** 0.285 * 0.287 * 0.298 * 0.297 * 0.295 * 0.296 *  
                           (1.975)  (1.856)  (1.867)  (1.938)  (1.930)  (1.915)  (1.929)   
 Diversified -0.161 *** -0.162 *** -0.151 *** -0.157 *** -0.155 *** -0.156 *** -0.156 ***  
                           (-4.045)  (-3.973)  (-3.746)  (-3.937)  (-3.877)  (-3.887)  (-3.907)   
 Credit & Securities 0.082          
                           (0.832)          
 Credit & Insurance        0.090        
                            (1.366)        
 Securities & Insurance   -0.045       
                             (-0.804)       
 Com. Bank & Insurance    0.246 *    
                              (1.945)     
 Com. Bank & Invest. Bank      0.145 ***   
                                (4.351)    
 Invest. Bank & Insurance       0.075    
        (1.084)    
 Credit & Securities & Insurance       0.090  
        (0.838)  
 Lnassets                  0.011  0.013  0.013  0.012  0.012  0.012  0.012   
                           (0.550)  (0.680)  (0.660)  (0.626)  (0.594)  (0.597)  (0.604)   
 Leverage -0.565 *** -0.569 *** -0.561 *** -0.573 *** -0.567 *** -0.563 *** -0.566 ***  
                           (-3.300)  (-3.307)  (-3.261)  (-3.338)  (-3.287)  (-3.269)  (-3.295)   
 ROA 0.144  0.158  0.149  0.161  0.153  0.155  0.154   
                           (0.614)  (0.681)  (0.646)  (0.696)  (0.662)  (0.671)  (0.663)   
 R-squared (within) 0.033  0.033  0.032  0.034  0.032  0.032  0.032   
 F-test 5.820  5.410  5.480  6.160  7.550  5.290  5.550   
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
 Number of Sector Pairs 148  272  291  30  15  70  53   
 Firms 664  664  664  664  664  664  664   
 N                         4,054  4,054  4,054  4,054  4,054  4,054  4,054   
 
This table reports estimates from fixed effects regressions of the excess value measure based on sales on a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one segment on 
Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), a set of dummy variables for specific combinations of financial activity-areas, and controls. We include the following control variables: 
the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), book leverage (Leverage), and return on assets (ROA). The financial sectors are based on the SIC and NAICS classification 
codes and defined as follows: credit intermediation and related activities (Credit; NAICS 522, SIC 60/61), securities, commodity contracts, and other financial investments and 
related activities (Securities; NAICS 523, SIC 62), insurance carriers and related activities (Insurance; NAICS 524, SIC 63/64), commercial banking (Com. Bank; NAICS 5221, 
SIC 602), and investment banking (Invest. Bank; NAICS 52311, SIC 6211). The standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White 
sandwich estimator, which accounts for the dependence of observations within clusters (different year-observations for one specific firm). An F-test is performed for the simulta-
neous significance of all coefficients (except the constant). ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
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Table 11: Fixed effects regressions of the excess value measure based on sales including variables for geographic diversification 
 
 Dependent Variable: Excess Value based on Sales         
 Financial Sector: All  All  Credit  Credit  Securities  Securities  Insurance  Insurance   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)   
 Intercept 0.156  -0.430  -1.074 ** -1.341 ** -0.324  -1.176 * 0.614 ** 0.192   
                           (0.944)  (-1.611)  (-2.354)  (-2.483)  (-1.280)  (-1.828)  (2.439)  (0.484)   
 Diversified               -0.172 *** -0.170 *** -0.198 ** -0.193 ** -0.347 *** -0.331 *** -0.126 ** -0.126 **  
                           (-4.116)  (-4.043)  (-2.403)  (-2.174)  (-3.464)  (-3.110)  (-2.539)  (-2.538)   
 Geogr. Diversified 0.047   0.183 **  -0.182 **  0.053 *   
                           (1.581)   (2.367)   (-2.150)   (1.721)    
 Geogr. HHI (Assets)   0.615 ***  0.713 *  0.612 *  0.492 *  
                             (3.205)   (1.672)   (1.655)   (1.857)   
 ln(Assets) 0.028  0.035  0.113 ** 0.085 * 0.044  0.074 * 0.018  0.017   
                           (1.300)  (1.640)  (2.265)  (1.899)  (1.180)  (1.758)  (0.643)  (0.605)   
 Leverage -0.556 *** -0.580 *** 0.194  0.070  0.285  0.202  -1.142 *** -1.141 ***  
                           (-2.871)  (-3.054)  (0.548)  (0.212)  (1.236)  (0.910)  (-2.897)  (-2.910)   
 ROA 0.187  0.193  0.409  0.202  0.381  0.304  0.846 * 0.827 *  
                           (0.690)  (0.717)  (0.743)  (0.377)  (0.883)  (0.709)  (1.835)  (1.784)   
 R-squared (within) 0.034  0.042  0.063  0.050  0.086  0.079  0.104  0.108   
 F-test 6.292 *** 7.031 *** 4.340 *** 2.570 ** 4.540 *** 3.210 *** 5.950 *** 5.790 ***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.029)  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
 Geogr. Div. Firm-Years 2,382  2,371  464  463  462  461  1,428  1,419   
 Firms 620  619  151  151  121  120  325  325   
 N                         3,574  3,563  658  657  687  686  2,173  2,164   
 
This table reports estimates from fixed effects regressions of the excess value measure based on sales on a dummy variable whether a firm is functionally diversified, a dummy vari-
able whether a firm is geographically diversified (and alternatively an asset-based Herfindahl index constructed for geographic segments), and control variables. Columns 1 and 2 
present the results from an analysis including all firm-year observations, Columns 3 to 8 for sub-samples based on the firms' main industry. The explanatory variables are defined as 
follows: a dummy variable whether the firm reports more than one product segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Diversified), a dummy variable whether the firm reports more 
than one geographic segment on Compustat’s Segments tape (Geogr. Diversified), an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index computed as the sum of the squares of each seg-
ment’s assets as a proportion of total assets for the firm (Geogr. HHI (Assets)), the natural logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)), book leverage (Leverage), and return on assets 
(ROA). The standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the cluster-robust variant of the Huber-White sandwich estimator, which accounts for the dependence of observations 
within clusters (different year-observations for one specific firm). An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant). ***/**/* denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
